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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Trademark dilution is a right awarded to famous trademark holders to prevent the
use of the same or similar marks on non-competing goods or services.1 Trademark
infringement, in contrast, requires competition; if there is no competition between the
parties, there can be no infringement.2 The concept of dilution was created to plug this
“gap.”3 That is, Kodak camera company could bring a suit for trademark dilution against
a company making “Kodak” brand cameras,4 but such a suit would not doctrinally satisfy
the requisite elements for trademark infringement because there would be no competition
between a bicycle manufacturer and a camera manufacturer.
Japanese trademark dilution jurisprudence is in a state of confusion. In an
otherwise highly rational, highly developed system, this scattered jurisprudence is
unexpected. 5 Perhaps the cause of action is still too new, 6 or perhaps Japanese courts,
*

Professor of Law and Director of Intellectual Property Law Studies, William Mitchell College of Law;
J.D. University of Wisconsin. I am deeply indebted to the following people for their input on this article:
Masako Yoshida, Laurie Sheen, and, most importantly, Toshiya Keneko. This article was prepared while I
was Foreign Research Fellow at the Tokyo University’s Business Law Center under the gracious auspices
of Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama.
1
David S. Welkowitz, Trademark Dilution 5 (2002) to source of definition. For purposes of this article,
this shall be the definition of dilution.
2
Id. at 4.
3
See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831
(1927).
4
This has now become the ubiquitous trademark dilution example. It comes from the facts of an old
trademark case from England. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., [1898] 15 R.P.C. 105 (High Ct. of
Justice) (finding Kodak on bicycles lessened the distinctive capacity of Kodak on photographic supplies).
This case has been relied upon by commentators to simply and easily crystallize the apparent problem that
dilutive conduct raises. See, e.g., Monica Hof Wallace, Using the Past to Predict the Future: Refocusing
the Analysis of a Federal Dilution Claim, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 945, 947 (2005). A version of this idea,
Kodak brand pianos, was even used in the legislative history of the United States Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1996, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995); see also
Brief for Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Moseley v.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)(“If a company could sell bicycles under the Kodak name,
surely another could sell pizza, another gloves, and still another desks. No longer could one refer to
‘Kodak’ without more. . . .”).
5
See, e.g., KENNETH L. PORT, JAPANESE TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1998); Brent Yonehara,
Landoftherisingsun.co.jp: A Review of Japan’s Protection of Domain Names Against Cybersquatting, 43
IDEA 207, 212 (2003) (“The Trademark Law is a substantively modern statute. It provides for acquisition
of trademark rights, trademark registration procedures, substantive trademark rights, and remedies for
trademark infringement”); Masaya Suzuki, The Trademark Registration System in Japan: A Firsthand
Review and Exposition, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 133, 133 (2001) (“. . . an examination of Japanese
trademark registration reveals layers of complexity”); Frank X. Curci, Protecting Your Intellectual
Property Rights Overseas, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 15 (2002); Masumi Anna Osaki, Comment, A Look at
Damage Awards Under Japan’s Trademark Law and Unfair Competition Prevention Law, 8 PAC. RIM. L.
& POL’Y J. 489 (1999) (arguing the Japanese system used to be imbued with particular Japanese cultural
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much like American courts,7 are reticent to recognize the full scope of the dilution right.
It is more likely, however, that the confused status of Japanese trademark dilution law
indicates a judiciary at odds with the legislature. This jurisprudence is not scattered
because of a lack of technical skill by the judiciary, but to rein in a right the judiciary sees
as inconsistent with the purposes of trademark protection in Japan.
The Japanese Legislature first recognized something resembling a dilution cause of
action in 1993. In that year, the Japanese legislature (“Diet”) amended the Unfair
Competition Prevention Act (hereinafter “UCPA”).8 The two provisions of the UCPA
that courts have used to deal with trademark dilution are as follows:
Article 2-1: As used in this Law, the term “unfair competition” shall mean:
(1) the act of using the Goods or Other Appellations9 (as used hereinafter,
“Goods or Other Appellation” shall mean a name connected with a
person’s business, trade name, trademark, mark, the container or package
of goods, or any other appellation of goods or businesses) which is
identical with, or similar to, another party’s Goods or Other Appellation
that is well-known among the consumers,10 . . . and causes confusion with
the goods or business of that other party’s.
(2) the act of using Goods or Other Appellations of another that are
identical with, or similar to, another person’s famous Goods or Other
Appellations . . . .11

particularities but the times have changed and larger damage awards are now being granted to plaintiffs).
6
The new law took effect in 1993.
7
See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 841-51 (1997); Jacqueline A. Knapp, The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act: The Circuit Split Makes a Desperate Call to the Supreme Court for Uniformity, 19
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 889-91 (2003); Jonathan Mermin, Interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995: The Logic of Actual Dilution Requirement, 42 B.C. L. REV. 207 (2000).
8
Fusei kyoso boshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993, translated in EHS
LAW BULL. SER. no. 6895 (1998) [hereinafter “UCPA”]. The original law is Fusei kyoso boshiho [Unfair
Competition Prevention Act], Law NO. 14 of 1934. The 1993 update was done so that Japan would be in
compliance with the TRIPs Agreement signed in 1994. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). Article 16(3) of the TRIPs
Agreement is said to be a dilution provision. See AKIRA OJIMA, CHIKUJO KAISETSU TRIPS KYOTEI
[CLAUSE BY CLAUSE EXPLANATION OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT] 89 (1999).
9
Many translate this word (hyoji) as “indication” rather than “appellation.” See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER
HEATH, THE SYSTEM OF U NFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION IN JAPAN 26-27 (2001). The Japanese word
“hyoji” can also mean “expression.” I think “appellation” is a more fitting translation, because that is the
intent of the word. Either it acts as an appellation of source or not. Furthermore, “appellation” just seems
more natural. Generally speaking, Americans speak of appellations of source, not indications of source.
Additionally, an “indication” is what a thing might be; an “appellation” is what something might be called.
As such, using “indication” here seems inappropriate. An alternative translation is “business designation.”
See Frank X. Curci & Tamotsu Takura, Selected Aspects of Japanese Intellectual Property Law, 8
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 84 (1995). The UCPA speaks only of “appellations” and not of “marks” or
“trademarks.” The reason for this is to clarify the distinction between “trademarks” (shyohyo), which by
definition are registered, and non-registered indicators of source (hyoji or appellations).
10
Here “the consumers” means “consumers that actually use the good or service.”
11
UCPA, Article 2.1. This and all translations of Japanese documents and cases in this article were
done by the author.
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The most striking omission from these two statutory provisions is the word
“dilution” (kishakuka) itself. Japan has no statute containing the term “dilution” that
provides a cause of action for an owner of a famous trademark to prevent the subsequent
use of that trademark on dissimilar goods in a non-competing manner. Therefore,
although Japan is a civil law country, and courts must only apply the law as stated, rather
than generate new options through their opinions,12 by definition any dilution case in
Japan is judge-made law.
Although Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA is considered to be the “dilution” provision,
not Article 2-1-1,13 in many important cases that reference dilution directly, courts rely
on Article 2-1-1, and not Article 2-1-2.14 Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA has been broadly
utilized to prevent the use of any well-known registered or unregistered appellations of
source.15 Litigants have relied on it to prevent the use of everything from shelving
shaped like a beehive16 to the importation of pharmaceuticals bearing the word
VIAGRA.17 As such, it is also relied upon to prevent dilution.18
Japanese courts often do not make the critical distinction between a provision that
requires a showing of confusion (Article 2-1-1) and one that does not (Article 2-1-2).19
Furthermore, Japanese courts do not distinguish between “causes confusion” and “an
apprehension” of confusion.20
In the twelve years since inception of the UCPA,21 there have been relatively few
reported decisions that squarely address dilution.22 In the same time period, there have
12
See generally Zentaro Kitagawa, Theory Perception – One Aspect of the Development of Japanese
Civil Law Science (Ronald E. Lee trans.), in JAPANESE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 3 (Koichiro Fujikura ed.,
1996). See also Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the
Service of – Stability?, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 635 (1996); Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of
Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317, 360 (1992).
13
CHIKUJO KAISETSU FUSEI KYOSO BOSHIHO [CLAUSE BY CLAUSE EXPLANATION OF THE UNFAIR
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] 45 (2003) [hereinafter “EXPLANATION OF THE UCPA”].
14
See, e.g., Negurosu Denko K.K. v. Matsushita Denko K.K., 1819 HANREI JIHO 121 (Tokyo Koto
Saibansho, May 31, 2002).
15
The Trademark Law, Law No. 127 of 1959, applies only to registered trademarks, not to general
unregistered appellations of source, and has no language which might be extended to apply to dilution. The
Japanese have elected to rely exclusively on the Unfair Competition Prevention Act to address dilution
claims.
16
K.K. Tying v. K.K. Zero First Design, 1833 HANREI JIHO 142 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 9, 2003).
17
Fizer Products, Inc. v. Yasuido Int’l, 1805 HANREI JIHO 140 (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 26, 2002).
18
Parfums Nina Ricci v. Madorasu K.K., 1040 HANREI TAIMUZU 125 (Sup. Ct., July 11, 2000) (the
“apprehension of confusion” envisioned in Article 4-1-5 of the Trademark Law is broad enough to include
dilution–although not specifically relying on Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA).
19
This is similar to the United States where courts often require “confusion” before they will find
dilution, even though confusion is not an element of the claim. See, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs.,
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D.N.J. 2002) (arguing no confusion, then handling the claim of dilution); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Office Max, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 409, 418 (E.D. Va. 1996) (asserting that confusion is not
required to be found under the Dilution Act); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Clinical Data, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 604, 607
(D. Mass. 1985) (claiming that even though confusion is argued, it is not necessary for a dilution claim).
20
An apprehension of confusion is close, but not exactly the same as, the “likelihood of confusion”
standard used in the United States. See PORT, supra note 5, at 83. In the United States, we would call this
issue actual confusion as compared to a likelihood of confusion.
21
The amended UCPA was passed on May 19, 1993.
22
As determined by searching http://legal.lexisnexis.jp (last visited Sept. 1, 2005). Also as determined
by searching the Japanese Supreme Court web site at http://courts.co.jp (last visited Sept. 1, 2005). A
2002 study reports that there had been some forty-eight cases decided up to that time. Masaharu Miyawaki,
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been over 1,300 opinions issued regarding federal trademark dilution in the United States
23
and countless other state court claims. That is, United States courts have been
inundated with trademark dilution claims. This is not the case in Japan.
¶9
Why are there so few opinions in Japan? In a society with one half the population
of the United States24 and the second largest economy in the world,25 would not one
expect more trademark dilution cases?
¶10
The point of this article is to directly address this paucity of trademark dilution
cases in Japan. This article concludes that first, there are more dilution cases brought in
Japan than are reported (although that number is probably negligible). Second, because
the UCPA is vague and does not even use the word “dilution,” Japanese courts do not or
cannot distinguish between fundamental elements of the cause of action. Third, the
defensive trademark system, underutilized as it is, provides an alternative to dilution
protection. Finally, the theoretical understanding of trademark law renders dilution
claims superfluous.26
¶11
The result is that the dilution cause of action is very unsure in Japan. This lack of
certainty may prevent some entities from recognizing and pursuing their rights under the
statute. The confused state of Japanese dilution protection indicates that Japanese courts
do not understand the cause of action or are reticent to apply it as it is written. Given the
high degree of technical skill of Japanese judges,27 it is not likely that they are simply
making serious errors when applying dilution law to any given set of facts. Rather, it
appears that Japanese judges have an inherent distrust of the notion of dilution. Japanese
judges seem reluctant to apply the language as written and, instead, seek other options to
attempt to confine the expansion of the trademark right.
II. WHAT DILUTION STATUTE?
¶12

The language of Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA is vague and broad, and clearly
contemplates preventing the use of someone else’s well-known appellation of source. As
such, for both clauses 1 and 2 of Article 2-1 of the UCPA, the initial inquiry involves
determining what an “appellation” is. Infringing use can take the form of any appellation
of source; however, Japanese courts have yet to broaden the understanding of this
Expansion of the Scope of Protection Under Law of Business Symbols: Based on US Law Concerning
Dilution, INST. OF INTELL. PROP., TOKYO, JAPAN, (2002). However, the number forty-eight is derived by
counting all cases, even those that were subsequently appealed. Of those, seven were appealed to the
relevant High Court. Therefore, in reality, this count should be forty-one. In addition, many of these fortyone cases mention dilution only in passing.
23
Lexis search performed on or about May 23, 2005. Needless to say, that number would be quite a bit
larger if you added all of the state dilution cases which did not rely on the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). (hereinafter “FTDA”).
24
Japan’s 2005 population is about 127.4 million. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST A SIAN AND PAC.
AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: JAPAN (Aug. 2005), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142/htm. (last
visited Apr. 18, 2006) The United States’ 2005 population is about 297.4 million. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
ANNUAL POPULATION ESTIMATES 2000-2005 (Dec. 21, 2005), at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html. (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
25
DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST A SIAN AND PAC. A FFAIRS, supra note 24 (“Japan’s industrialized,
free market economy is the second-largest in the world.”).
26
Kenneth L. Port, Protection of Famous Trademarks in the United States and Japan, 15 WIS. INT’ L
L.J. 259, 279 (1997).
27
JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 40 (1998).
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provision to sensory marks.28 Although the scent of thread was recognized as a valid and
registrable trademark in the United States, it would not be possible to protect such
indicators of source in Japan.
In the SEIROGAN TOI A case,29 the Osaka District Court concluded that each of
the component parts of the name were common descriptive terms, but the combination of
these terms, the long period of use, and the remarkable success of the product made it
appropriate to call what the plaintiff had an “appellation” (hyoji).30
In another case, a middle school started using the term Aoyama Gakuin Chugakko
to refer to its school. Aoyama Gakuin University is a Methodist college that started in
Tokyo in 1874,31 a mere six years after Japan was opened to the outside world.32 The
middle school was enjoined from using that name after the college established that its
name amounted to an “appellation” of source (hyoji).33 It is not surprising that this
school was able to establish that their name was an appellation after 127 years of
exclusive use.
The core of Article 2-1-1 seeks to prevent the use of a “well-known” (hiroku
ninshikisareteiru) “good or other appellation” (“shohintohyoji”) – either registered or
unregistered. However, what constitutes a “good or other appellation” is not entirely
apparent. It is clear that the statute contemplates a good itself as indicating source
because it uses the term “shohintohyoji,” which would literally be translated as “good or
other appellation.” On the other hand, the statute defines shohintohyoji in a parenthetical
as “a name connected with a person’s business, trade name, trademark, mark, the
container or package of goods, or any other appellation of goods or businesses.” Despite
the implication of the word shohintohyoji, its given definition seems to preclude the
protection of “goods” themselves unless the good in question is a “container or packaging
of [other] goods.”34
Article 2-1-1 also requires the plaintiff to show actual confusion – “causes
confusion” “kondowo shojisaseru.”35 In order for confusion to be established, the parties
28

Registering and recognizing rights in sensory marks in the United States is now quite common. See,
e.g., Nancy L. Clarke, Note, Issues in the Federal Registration of Flavors as Trademarks for
Pharmaceutical Products, 1993 U. I LL. L. REV. 105 (1993); Faye M. Hammersley, The Smell of Success:
Trade Dress Protection For Scent Marks, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 105 (1998).
29
Taiko Pharmaceuticals, K.K. v. Nisshin Pharmaceuticals K.K., 1023 HANREI TAIMUZU 257 (Osaka D.
Ct., Nov. 3, 1999) (holding that SEIROGAN TOI A, a sugar coated anti-diarrhea medicine, was famous).
Seirogan claimed that soldiers used its anti-diarrhea medicine during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).
Taiko still uses a trumpet, a symbol of charging troops, as its trademark for Seiro-gan. It used to use
slightly different kanji characters for its name (pronounced the same way). The old characters meant “a pill
to conquer Russia.” Taiko changed Seirogan to the present characters in 1949, four years after World War
II ended. See http://www.seirogan.co.jp/company/history.html.
30
Taiko Pharmaceuticals, 1023 HANREI TAIMUZU at 257.
31
See Aoyama Gakuin University, About the University,
http://www.aoyama.ac.jp/en/outline/history.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
32
See Kenneth L. Port & Gerald McAlinn, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN
JAPAN 29-34 (2d ed. 2003).
33
Aoyama Gakuin v. Shimizugaoka Gakuen, 1815 HANREI JIHO 148 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 19, 2001).
34
See, e.g., [Parties Unnamed], 8 MUTAI REISHU 462 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 8, 1976) (butter container
protected). But cf. K.K. Tsukuda Original v. K.K. Lana, 1781 HANREI JIHO 142 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 12,
2001) (Rubik’s Cube is well-known for purposes of Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA and, as such, a protectable
appellation).
35
“It is given that a prerequisite to establishing confusion as to business interests is the establishment
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must be in competition with each other. As such, it does not appear to be the appropriate
provision for preventing dilution; however, as stated above, several courts have relied
upon this provision. Article 2-1-2, a provision that allows the holder of a famous
appellation of source to enforce that right against third parties regardless of competition,
is a more appropriate provision to apply to a likely dilution setting.36
A. The Evolution of Article 2-1-2:
¶17

In 1992, the Japanese government commissioned a study of the need to have a
“dilution-like” statute. It concluded as follows:
In the current information society, product or business appellations are
being more broadly used via a variety of different media. These brand
images are becoming well known. These independent brand images have
specific customer appeal. As such, they have attained an independent
value of their own. Through use of these famous appellations, for
example even when there is no confusion, such a user can gain the
customer appeal of this famous appellation even though he did nothing to
achieve it. This is known as “free riding.” As a result, consumers might
become confused that this newcomer is the same as the company that
endeavored to obtain high trust and repute. In this case, the good image of
the firstcomer would be damaged. This is known as “dilution.” [In such a
case in the past,] courts have simply presumed confusion even though the
facts of the case made confusion an impossibility. Judges have deemed
such a conclusion to be appropriate; however, they have come to question
the notion of presuming confusion. Therefore, frankly speaking, it is
appropriate to create a new cause of action where confusion is not
necessary in order to protect famous appellations.37

¶18

Several things become apparent from this summary. Most striking, of course, is
that the contemplated dilution cause of action is somewhat different than the typical
American notion of dilution, where actual harm must be shown to establish dilution when
marks are not identical.38 Although brand identity is a growing phenomenon in Japan, it
is certainly not the case that it did not exist prior to 1992, as the report of the intellectual
property policy committee suggests. Nevertheless, in the United States, while brands
might have an independent identity, they do not have an independent monetary value.39
that the parties were in competition.” EXPLANATION OF THE UCPA, supra note 13, at 45. One way or the
other, the objective of the 1993 amendments to the UCPA were to allow for the owner of a famous
appellation to be able to get redress, regardless of his ability to establish confusion. Id. at 46.
36
EXPLANATION OF THE UCPA, supra note 13, at 45.
37
SANGYO KOZO SHINGIKAI CHITEKI ZAISAN SEISAKU BUKAI HOKOKUSHO [REPORT OF THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL] (1992).
38
See, e.g., Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
39
This is sometimes referred to as the “Holmes/Hand Doctrine.” See, e.g., Monsanto Chem. Co. v.
Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1945); Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Duchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1937). See also Diane
Martens Reed, Use of “Like/Love” Slogans in Advertising: Is the Trademark Owner Protected?, 26 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 101 (1989); Weiqui Long, Intellectual Prop. in China, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 63, 72 (1999).
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Trademarks themselves are not property in the American system, as such, they cannot
have an “independent value.” Any value a trademark has is directly tied to the goodwill
behind the mark and thus can never be separated from that goodwill.40
¶19
Dilution is a cause of action somewhere between blurring and tarnishment.41 To
find a party liable, this report would require that the “good image” of the first-comer
actually be damaged somehow by the party engaged in dilution. Actual damage is
required. This is also a distinction that seems lost on Japanese courts.
¶20
Article 2-1-2 is incredibly broad in its scope. Any use of anyone’s famous good or
other appellation, regardless of confusion and regardless of competition between the
parties, creates a cause of action. To establish “dilution” under Article 2-1-2, the plaintiff
must establish the following:
1.
use of the plaintiff’s goods or other appellation by the defendant;
2.
the plaintiff’s appellation is famous;
3.
the defendant’s appellation is the same or similar to the plaintiff’s.42
¶21
There appears to be little case law on the first element.43 Essentially, this element
contemplates the obvious: that the defendant has to be using the plaintiff’s appellation.
This includes the possibility that the defendant may be using the appellation for
something other than source denoting purposes. It is only the source-denoting purpose
that is protected.44
B. Appellation Fame
¶22

Fame, on the other hand, deserves serious thought and attention, and Japanese
courts have responded to this challenge. Fame becomes relevant due to another key
distinction between Article 2-1-1 and Article 2-1-2. Article 2-1-1 applies to wellrecognized (hiroku ninshikisareteiru) goods or other appellations, while Article 2-1-2
applies only to famous (chomei) goods or other appellations. For an appellation to be

The doctrine is also clearly stated in the following cases: United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (asserting “there is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a right
appurtenant to established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed”); Thomas
Kefoot & Co. v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 59 F.2d 80, 90 (1932) (stating that a trademark does not create a
monopoly in a “proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of one’s
good-will in trade. . .”); Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine 318 F.3d 900, 906 (2003) (stating “the primary
cost of recognizing property rights in trademarks is the removal of words . . . from our language”). See
also Kenneth Port, The ‘Unnatural’ Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is A Federal Dilution Statute
Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433 (1994); Maya Alexandri, The International News QuasiProperty Paradigm and Trademark Incontestability: A Call for Rewriting the Lanham Act, 13 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 303 (2000); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademark and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 788 (2004) (“First and most generally, trademarks are not property in
gross . . .”).
40
If the report’s intent is to end the bizarre Japanese judicial practice of recognizing confusion in the
broad sense when the appellations are famous, but there is no confusion, this would be a good thing. See
SHIGEHIKO K ANAI, FUSEI KYOSO BOSHIHO K OMENTARU [UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION LAW AND
COMMENTARY] 42 (2004). The Japanese judiciary has not apparently responded as such.
41
Blurring refers to when a famous trademark is used in so many ways that the original source is not
easily identifiable. Tarnishment occurs when someone uses a famous trademark on a shoddy or inferior
product.
42
See generally UCPA, Article 2.1.
43
See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
44
EXPLANATION OF THE UCPA, supra note 13, at 46.
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well-known, it need not be known nationwide45 – simply being known by most people in
one region of Japan will suffice.46 However, for a mark to be famous, and thus protected
under Article 2-1-2, it generally needs to be known nationwide, such that even someone
in a completely different market would recognize it.47
1. Degree of Fame
¶23

To determine how “famous” a mark must be to trigger Article 2-1-2, courts
examine several elements.48 The first question involves the degree of fame. The second
asks “for whom must the mark be famous?” This second question can be further broken
down into questions of regional fame and field-specific fame. Shoen Ono describes the
requirement that the appellation be famous in the following terms: “[t]o be famous, an
appellation must achieve an exacting standard . . . it must appear to be a striking or
remarkable appellation.”49 Even though the degree of fame is supposed to be an exacting
standard,50 if the appellation is famous enough, Japanese courts will presume confusion.51
In the Levi Strauss & Co. v. K.K. Edwin Mfg.,52 the court found that the fact that a mere
18.3% of respondents nationwide could correctly identify the stitching on the rear
pockets of Levi’s jeans was adequate to establish that the mark was famous.53 This
decision begs the question that if 18.3% satisfies the test for a famous appellation,54 how
exacting could the standard be? A clear declaration of the standard by the court would
certainly be desirable. Given the status of dilution cases in Japan, however, this seems
very far off indeed.
2. Regional Fame

¶24

Although the basic, black letter rule about fame for the purposes of Article 2-1-2 is
that appellation must be nationally famous in Japan,55 some important commentators feel
45
See Curci & Takura, supra note 9, at 84. Appellations which are widely recognized in countries
outside of Japan may face special criteria for being recognized in Japan. See Curci, supra note 5, at 17
n.10, citing Japan Trademark Association, 5 JTA BULLETIN 3 (1998).
46
EXPLANATION OF THE UCPA, supra note 13, at 47.
47
Fame (chomei) under the Trademark Law is interpreted the same. Therefore, when a mark had
regional recognition but not nationwide fame, the mark is said not to be famous. See K.K. Tsuki Tomo no
KaiMaruai K.K. v. K.K. Kyoto Nishikawa, 13 MUTAI REISHU 793 (Tokyo High Ct., Nov. 5, 1981). For
examples of cases which found appellations to be famous, see Taiko Pharmaceuticals v. Nisshin
Pharmaceuticals K.K., 1023 HANREI TAIMUZU 257 (Osaka D. Ct., Nov. 3, 1999) (Holding that SEIROGAN
TOI A, a sugar coated anti-diarrhea medicine, is famous); Takeda Pharmaceuticals K.K. v. Toyo Farumer
K.K., 1044 HANREI TAIMUZU 246 (Osaka D. Ct., Sept. 16, 1999) (Holding that ALINAMIN is famous as
used on vitamin supplements and ALINABIG infringes).
48
See KANAI, supra note 40, at 45.
49
SHOEN ONO, SHIN CHUKAI FUSEI KYOSO BOSHIHO [NEW COMMENTARY ON THE UNFAIR
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] 288 (2000).
50
See KANAI, supra note 40, at 45.
51
See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
52
1032 HANREI TAIMUZU 281 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 6, 2000).
53
Id. at 290.
54
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Intern., Inc., 393 F.Supp. 502, 526 n.54 (C.D.N.Y. 1975)
(Stating that a survey conducted for litigation in the Teflon case in the United States showed that 6% of
respondents thought “refrigerator” was a trademark).
55
Tsuneyuki Yamamoto, YOSETSU FUSEI KYOSO BOSHIHO [Outline of the Unfair Competition
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differently. For example, if a product is used only in northern Japan, one could still
consider its appellation as famous, depending upon the characteristics of the product and
of the purchasers.56 There are others who feel that even though the appellation is not
famous nationwide, as long as the defendant is using the same or similar appellation
where it is famous, this use should suffice for the fame element.57 It is clear that the
standard for fame for the purposes of Article 2-1-2 is quite high. Although there may be
some narrow exceptions, nationwide fame is generally required.
3. Field of Use of Fame
Japanese commentators also discuss a “field of use” of fame.58 Under this theory,
there are fields of use where an otherwise famous mark would not be famous. While this
is directly inconsistent with the purpose of dilution prevention in the first place, there is
case law to support this theory. For example, in K.K. Toraya v. K.K. Kurokawa,59 the
plaintiff had used TORAYA on, or in connection with, many kinds of candies and bread.
The defendant intended to use TORAYAKUROKAWA on or in connection with the
manufacture and sale of Japanese sweet bean jelly, jewelry, textiles, and beauty salon
massages. The court held that the plaintiff’s appellation was famous in the field of
sweets but not in other fields.60
¶26
Holdings that presume confusion even when there is no competition seem to
weaken the fundamental purpose behind dilution protection in the first place: to prevent a
non-competitor from using a famous appellation on a non-competing good or service.
Taking these holdings on their face, it’s not hard to see why dilution rationale has been
unpopular in Japan.
¶25

4. Additional Requirements
¶27

There is some debate over what is required in addition to the level of fame an
appellation must have before it is protected.61 Some argue that an exceedingly high
brand identity is required.62 Tatsuki Shibuya lists the following as essential elements

Prevention Act] 113 (2002).
56
ONO, supra note 49, at 289. For example, northern Japan gets heavy snow in the winter. See The
Natural World of Japan: The Climate of Japan, at http://www.seinangu.ac.jp/~djohnson/natural/climate.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006). Okinawa, a tropical island in the
Pacific Ocean and also part of Japan, the average temperature in January is 61.3 degrees. See Seasonal
Averages, at http://www.shinryokan.com/e/news/weather.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006). Therefore,
winter wear would not be sold in Okinawa. If a manufacturer sold snowshoes, its appellation may become
famous in Hokkaido but not in Okinawa. It would be unfair to the owner of that appellation for snowshoes
to say that, by definition, it could not have a famous appellation. This is Ono’s concern.
57
YOSHIYUKI TAMURA, FUSEI KYOSOHO GAISETSU [OUTLINE OF THE UNFAIR COMPETITION
PREVENTION ACT] 243 (2003).
58
KANAI, supra note 40, at 47.
59
See K.K. Toraya v. K.K. Kurokawa Shoji, available at
http://legal.lexisnexis.jp/jp/lngateway.dll?f=templates&fn=defaultHome_JP.htm&vid=Japan:10.1048/Enu
(Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 21, 2000).
60
Injunction granted on other grounds. See id.
61
KANAI, supra note 40, at 47.
62
See YAMAMOTO, supra note 55, at 113.
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required for protection: (1) specific distinctiveness; (2) fame; (3) very high quality goods
or services; (4) unique positioning or status; and (5) abstract distinctiveness.63
¶28
It is difficult for Americans to conceive of the difference between “specific
distinctiveness” and “abstract distinctiveness.” Under American law, any “abstract”
distinctiveness of an appellation of source is unprotectable; however, if you apply it to
the traditional dilution rationale, it becomes a bit clearer. Specific distinctiveness is when
you hear the word KODAK and know that the manufacturer of the goods or services has
something to do with cameras. However, if the word KODAK is used on bicycles, there
is no longer specific distinctiveness because the Kodak company does not sell bicycles.
Expectation of some sponsorship of the bicycle company becomes the “abstract
distinctiveness” which Shibuya argues is an essential element.64
¶29
Others require that the mark be “particularly striking” (tokubetsu kenchosei).65
This would be a standard even in excess of “exceedingly high brand identity.” If this
standard were used uniformly, a truly “famous” appellation would be rare. Additionally,
in order to establish that a mark has been specifically diluted, some commentators require
much more than the claim that the appellation was famous.66 They also require a positive
determination regarding the appellation’s originality, uniqueness, and impression.67 In
other words,in addition to showing that the mark is famous, the plaintiff must establish
that the junior user’s goods or services are inferior.68
¶30
Overall, Japanese commentators conclude that in order to be protected by Article 21-2 of the UCPA, a mark has to be truly remarkable. It would seem that very few marks
could carry this burden. This may, of course, be why the number of cases is so small.
However, the cases that have been brought and succeeded in establishing fame involve
appellations other than Japan’s most famous marks such as Sony or Matsushita. Much
lesser appellations have succeeded in establishing fame. Therefore, in reality, this
“exacting standard” is not that exacting. That is, the mark must be remarkable but it does
not have to be among the strongest marks in the world.
C. Same or Similar Appellations
¶31

In order for the provisions of Article 2-1-1 or 2-1-2 to apply, the second-comer’s
appellation must be the same or similar to the first-comer’s.69 However, because
confusion is not required for an Article 2-1-2 violation, the element of similarity is given
extra weight.70 Similarity is determined by comparing the sound, meaning, and
appearance of the two appellations to determine if there is an apprehension that the two
could be confused by a customer.71
63
TATSUKI SHIBUYA, CHOMEIHYOJIBOYOKOI NITAISURU FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHOJO NO KISEI
[REGULATION OF FAMOUS A PPELLATIONS USING THE U NFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION A CT] 749 (1995).
64
Id.
65
TAMURA, supra note 57, at 242. Tamura concludes that marks such as WORLD or PURE would be
ineligible for protection under Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA.
66
[No. Clear from subsequent footnote]Cite to these commentators
67
ONO, supra note 49, at 298.
68
Id.
69
KANAI, supra note 40, at 50.
70
YAMAMOTO, supra note 55, at 121.
71
Aoyama Gakuin v. Shimizugaoka Gagakuen, 1815 HANREI JIHO 148 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 19, 2001).
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¶32

In determining similarity, the analysis should be broken down into three steps. The
first step is to determine the essential elements of the plaintiff’s appellation. The second
step is to determine the essential elements of the defendant’s appellation. The third step
is to compare the essential elements of the two appellations.72 The other non-essential
elements should be disregarded.73
¶33
Determining the essential elements of an appellation is done by omitting the
portions of the appellation that are common, descriptive terms. The remainder should
then be compared on an overall basis to determine if they are the same or similar in
sound, meaning, or appearance.74
¶34
Although the statute only allows the holders of “famous” appellations to prevent
the dilution if the second-comer’s appellation is the same or similar to the famous
appellation, courts seem willing to apply this in a manner that is not as strict as the black
letter law seems to imply.
III. REPRESENTATIVE CASES
¶35

There are relatively few trademark dilution cases in Japan.75 Below is a description
of some representative cases that would amount to precedent if Japan was a common law
system.76
A. Negurosu Denko KK v. Matsushita Denko KK 77

¶36

Negurosu is an electronics manufacturer. Matsushita is a competitor but operates
in a geographically different market. Matsushita adopted the shape of an electrical switch
which had been manufactured and sold by Negurosu for quite some time. The question
was whether this electrical switch could constitute a well-known78 good or appellation for
purposes of Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA and as such form the basis of an injunction
preventing the future sale and distribution of Matsushita’s electrical switch.

72

KANAI, supra note 40, at 50.
Id.
74
Id. at 53.
75
Because the term for dilution is not used in the statute, the cause of action is developing more as a
common law tort. Therefore, courts occasionally make conclusions which they sometimes mislabel as
dilution or reach dilution conclusions without labeling them as such. As there is no way one might search
specifically for the latter, the number of dilution cases may actually be higher than portrayed here. Either
way, the number of cases is small. See Miyawaki, supra note 22. Additionally, dilution has been held as
grounds to refuse registration of a mark. See K.K. Heaven Corp. v. JPO, 1762 HANREI JIHO 130 (Sup. Ct.,
Jul. 6, 2001) (holding that, as PALM SPRINGS POLO CLUB was likely to dilute or freeride on POLO
CLUB mark, it therefore violated Article 4-1-15 of the Trademark Law); Parfums Nina Ricci v. Madorasu
K.K., 1040 HANREI TAIMUZU 125 (Sup. Ct., July 11, 2000).
76
As a civil law system, judicial precedent does not have the weight that it does in common law
systems. See Kitagawa, supra, note 12. Even though de facto stare decis is developing in Japan,
technically speaking, a subsequent court does not have to follow prior precedent. The reality, of course, is
that most judges do now follow prior opinions. See HALEY, supra note 27, at 19-20.
77
Negurosu Denko K.K. v. Matsushita Denko K.K., 1819 HANREI JIHO 121 (Tokyo Koto Saibansho,
May 31, 2002).
78
Actually, the court uses yet another term, shuchi, which is sometimes translated as famous. Shuchi is
also a term used to describe when an appellation is well-known for purposes of Article 2-1-1.
73
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The Tokyo High Court held that the switch was a well-known good or other
appellation, and ordered Matsushita to cease sales of the switch and pay damages in the
amount of approximately $140,000. Regarding the dilution claim, however, the Tokyo
High Court stated as follows:
Matsushita argues that after it developed its product it used the same or
similar shape on or in connection with the sale of a plurality goods sold to
a plurality of consumers and that this situation continued for some time.
In such a situation, if there was dilution, the product’s shape would have
ceased to be an appellation of source and it would no longer be a famous
good or other appellation. To be sure, the type of dilution that Matsushita
argues for is possible; however, in that case, it would not be sufficient to
simply use the same product configuration on the same goods. In
Matsushita’s argument, actual sales for a period of time would be required
before dilution could occur. In the case at bar, [Negurosu’s products] have
a limited share of the marketplace. They do not have an overwhelming
presence in the marketplace and they have not been used for an extended
period. Therefore, we cannot say that through dilution Negurosu’s fame
of its appellation has been diminished.79

¶38

Of course, this is not a traditional dilution case even though the court labels it as
such. The court discusses “dilution” but analyzes this case under Article 2-1-1 of the
UCPA which is not a dilution statute because it requires the plaintiff to show confusion.
¶39
Additionally, Article 2-1-1 says “causes confusion” (kondowo shojisaseru), and not
“an apprehension of confusion” (kondono osore), which is used as the test for
determining trademark infringement.80 The court here determines that the test for
dilution should be an apprehension of dilution without recognizing that this case falls
under Article 2-1-1, as the parties are in competition with each other.
¶40
In the United States, the Supreme Court requires a showing of actual dilution if the
marks are not identical.81 Although Congress is doing its best to overturn this outcome,82
at least for the time being, the United States applies a more restrictive standard to dilution
than Japanese courts apply.83
79

Negurosu Denko K.K., 1819 HANREI JIHO at 130.
See PORT, supra note 5, at 83. However, Japanese courts interpret this “causes confusion” as
“apprehension that confusion will be caused.” (kondoga shoshiruosorega aru). See Chanel ASA v.
Sugimura, 986 HANREI TAIMUZU 181 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 10, 1999).
81
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)
82
At the time of this writing, both the House and the Senate had passed bills that would amend the
Lanham Act to make the standard for dilution claims a “likelihood” of dilution, not actual dilution.
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. 683, 109th CONG. (2005); H.R. 683 EAS, Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate).
83
See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 2002) (claiming that
factors for likelihood of dilution include (1) blurring, or (2) tarnishment); Paco Sport, Ltd. v. Paco Rabanne
Perfumes, 234 F.3d 1262 (2000) (asserting a dilution claim must prove (1) the trademark is truly distinctive
or has acquired secondary meaning; (2) a likelihood of dilution either as a result of blurring or tarnishing;
and (3) predatory intent); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996)
(stating two elements for a dilution claim: (1) ownership of a distinctive mark and (2) a likelihood of
dilution).
80
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B. Tokyo Kyuko Dentetsu KK v. Takachi Noboru84
¶41

In this rather odd case, an entertainer took the stage name of Takachi Noboru,
represented by kanji characters that also read “kochi tokyu” or Tokyu Coach, and started
performing in January of 1993. The plaintiff, Tokyo Kyuko Dentetsu, had used the
appellation “Tokyu” since 1922. Its use resulted in that appellation becoming wellknown as part of the “Tokyu Group” set of marks. Based on Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA,
the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the use of “Tokyu.”
¶42
This case is ripe with Japanese puns and a little complicated to explain in English.
The plaintiff, among other activities, operated a bus line called Tokyu Coach beginning
in 1976. Another reading of the kanji characters representing the defendant’s stage name
is “kochi tokyu” or “Tokyu Coach,” precisely the appellation used by the plaintiff for
thirty years in different characters but resulting in the same pronunciation.
¶43
In an opinion that is said to feel the effects of the American dilution rationale,85 the
Tokyo District Court found the appellations confusing and issued the injunction. As a
general rule, for the appellations to be confusing, the parties must be in competition with
one another. In a one-sentence conclusion, the court observed that it was not possible to
believe that the parties were not in competition whatsoever (using this double negative).86
That is, because the court elected to use the double negative, it appeared like it was
backing into this conclusion. The court clearly was bending over backwards to find
competition when none really existed. As such, enough competition was shown for
establishing the Article 2-1-1 cause of action, and the court does not have to address any
dilution claim.87
¶44
The defendant claimed that he was engaged in parody and that he had come to rely
on the acquiescence of the plaintiff. In response to this argument, the court stated:
However, Article 2–1–1 of the UCPA includes the right to prevent acts
which amount to the free-riding of a well-known appellation whose value
has been built up over time through unusual effort and the right to prevent
the dilution of such well-known appellation. The defendant claims that he
adopted the stage name so he would have a name that was distinctive and
was easy to remember. However, the stage name is not a natural person’s
name, was not a name the entertainer was assigned at birth, and is a name
he chose himself. As such, the conduct of promoting the stage name as a
famous name using someone else’s well-known appellation or a portion
thereof is conduct . . . which the UCPA prohibits. There is no evidence
that the plaintiff specifically allowed this conduct and no evidence that the
plaintiff permitted this alleged custom. Therefore, we cannot employ the
defendant’s theory.88

84
85
86
87
88
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1639 HANREI JIHO 115 (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 13, 1998).
See supra note 7 and surrounding text.
1639 HANREI JIHO at 120.
Id. at 121.
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Although this analysis of dilution is repeated in the case a number of times, there is
no discussion of what “dilution” might mean or what the parameters of the claim might
be. The reader is left taking judicial notice that there is something called dilution
(kishakuka) and, whatever it is, it happened in this case.
C. Gibson Guitar Corporation v. Fernandes, K.K.89

¶46

Gibson Guitar had sold its Les Paul design for decades in Japan. Fernandes and
others adopted a similarly shaped electric guitar. Although Gibson prevailed on its claim
of dilution in the United States,90 it failed in its attempts to enjoin Fernandes in Japan.
Specifically addressing a dilution claim, the Tokyo High Court stated as follows:
Gibson’s Les Paul guitar became well known among rock musicians and
fans in Japan at least by 1973. We also have found above that this product
configuration has come to represent Gibson’s goods in the music industry.
We have also found, however, that since at least 1973, Gibson’s product
configuration no longer represented the source or origin of any good. That
is, for over twenty years more than thirty different brands were being used
to sell guitars that resembled appellant’s product configuration. During
this period, Gibson admits that it took no steps to curb such use.
Therefore, it is impossible to say that consumers recognize the source of
the Les Paul guitar simply by looking at the good. Thus, consumers
would not remember the particular source of the guitars merely by looking
at their shape.
On this point, Gibson argues that the dead copies being manufactured and
sold in Japan were knowingly placed in the stream of commerce as dead
copies. The manufacturers were passing these products off not as their
own goods but as those of Gibson’s. As such, these copies in the stream
of commerce diluted Gibson’s ability to use the product configuration to
identify it as the source of the goods. Therefore, Gibson argues that the
Les Paul shape lost its ability to identify Gibson as the source of its
guitars.
The reality, however, is that the consumers recognize Gibson’s guitar as
one of the many copies and, as such, Gibson’s guitar configuration does
not function to identify a particular source of the goods; rather it now
identifies many sources of the particular goods.
Gibson argues that consumers, upon being confronted with the Les Paul
guitar, confuse the configuration of the goods with the source of the
goods. This, however, simply is mistaken. Even if consumers, when
confronted with the Les Paul guitar, know that it originated with Gibson,

89
90

Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Fernandes, K.K., 1719 HANREI JIHO 122 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 24, 2000).
Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, L.P. 423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005).
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and even if they know a copy from the original, they do not believe that all
guitars shaped like the Les Paul model originated with Gibson.91
¶47

Normally, a dilution cause of action arises when there is no competition between
the parties. Here, although the parties were in direct, head-to-head competition in the
marketplace, the court was detered. Instead, the court concluded that guitars shaped like
the Les Paul guitar had become so popular in the marketplace and that the shape of the
guitar had become generic.92 It appears that one lesson from this case is that dilution in
Japan does not apply only to non-competitors. Because the UCPA in Article 2-1-2 is
silent on the role of competition, this court presumed that it meant that the statute applied
to competitors and non-competitors alike.
D. Kobayashi v. Uesugi93

¶48

Yoshinori Kobayashi is a famous and extremely controversial author of manga in
Japan. Some manga are far more than mere conventional comic books. Some manga are
serialized, sophisticated, and tell quite elaborate, mature stories.94 In keeping with
Kobayashi’s general persona, his manga are extremely controversial as well, such as
including alternative histories of major events such as World War II. In the manga at
issue in this lawsuit, titled “On Taiwan,” Kobayashi depicts Taiwanese women begging
to become Japanese soldiers’ sex slaves in order to advance their social standing.95
¶49
Kobayashi is also a lead editor of a history textbook published by the Japanese
Society for History Textbook Reform.96 When this textbook received Ministry of
Education approval, riots broke out in China and Sino-Japanese relations reached their
lowest level in post-war history.97 Kobayashi has an extremist, right-wing agenda, but he
is also making record sales of his manga in Japan.98
¶50
In Kobayashi v. Uesugi, Uesugi wrote a book that criticized Kobayashi’s manga
“Gohmanism Sengen.”99 Uesugi’s book was titled “Datsu Gohmanism Sengen.”100
91

1719 Harei Jiho at 130-132. Translated in Kenneth L. Port, Japanese Intellectual Property Law in
Translation: Representative Cases and Commentary, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 847, 869 (2001).
92
1719 Harei Jiho at 132.
93
1702 HANREI JIHO 145 (Tokyo D. Ct., Aug. 31, 1999), aff’d, 1831 HANREI JIHO 107 (Tokyo High
Court, July 31, 2003), aff’d, 1870 HANREI JIHO 15 (Sup. Ct., July 15, 2004).
94
The leading American commentator on manga is Salil K. Mehra of Temple Law School. See Salil K.
Mehra, Copyright, Control, and Comics: Japanese Battles Over Downstream Limits on Content, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 181 (2003); Salil K. Mehra, Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All
the Cartoons My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 155 (2002).
95
See Christine Wawrynek, World War II Comfort Women: Japan’s Sex Slaves or Hired Prostitutes, 19
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 913, 917 (2003).
96
See www.tsukurukai.com. For a full text of chapters 4 and 5 of the book (in English), see
www.tsukurukai.com/05_rekisi_text/rekishi_English.pdf.
97
Norimitsu Onishi, In Japan’s New Text: Lessons in Rising Nationalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, at
4.
98
Howard W. French, Japan’s Resurgent Far Right Tinkers with History, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2005, at
3.
99
Yoshinori Kobayashi, Shin Gohmanism Sengen (New Gohmanism Manifesto) serialized from 1996 to
present. See also Yoshinori Kobayashi, On the War, GOHMANISM SENGEN: SPECIAL: SENSORON (Special
Declaration of Gohmanism) (1998).
100
SATOSHI UESUGI, DATSU GOMANIZUMU SENGEN: KOBAYASHI YOSHINORI NO “IANFU” MONDAI (EX-
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“Sengen” means “manifesto” or “declaration.” “Gohmanism” is more controversial, as
Kobayashi coined the term. Literally, gohmanism means “arrogant-ism.” Therefore,
literally translated, Kobayashi’s title means “Declaration of Arrogant-ism.” Uesugi’s
book title means “Ex-Declaration of Arrogant-ism.”
¶51
What this really means is that Kobayashi believes only that he is right (he seems, at
least, to believe in his manga). The manga stands for the notion that one should be proud
of being arrogant because it is only through this arrogance that people might actually see
the “true” story of Japan’s history. Gohmanism would have us believe that World War II
was fought for the noble cause of freeing Asia from white colonists, that sex slaves in
Korea and China thank their persecutors for improving their status in life, and that war
crimes in the rape of Nanking did not happen.101 Essentially, this amounts to Japanese
ultra-right wing extremist vacuousness.
¶52
Uesugi’s book consisted of a panel by panel discussion of the accuracy of
Kobayashi’s claims. Uesugi pointed out the oddities as well as the outright myths
perpetuated by the characters in Kobayashi’s work. Kobayashi did not take kindly to
being criticized; and consequently sued Uesugi for copyright infringement. Kobayashi
claimed that “gohmanism” acted as an appellation of source, and the mark had become
famous.102
¶53
The district court agreed with Kobayashi that “gohmanism” was a good or other
appellation. They disagreed, however, that Uesugi had “used” that good or other
appellation as required by Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA. On this point, the Tokyo District
Court concluded:
“Datsu Gohmanism Sengen” is the title of the defendant’s book. Since the
defendant’s book title includes the title of the plaintiff’s work, we
conclude that the defendant’s use is a good or other appellation.
However, if one includes someone else’s good or other appellation in
explaining the goods, contents or characteristics of that person’s work, we
will not call such conduct the “use” of that good or other appellation or a
similar appellation thereto [for purposes of the Unfair Competition
Prevention Act]. . . . The defendant’s use of “Gohmanism Sengen” was to
explain the content of his book. As such, we do not recognize the
argument that the defendant used the plaintiff’s appellation or an
appellation similar thereto.103
¶54

If this case arose in the United States, the fair use doctrine would apply.104 Uesugi
is making a nominative fair use of Kobayashi’s appellation.105 He is not using it in order
DECLARATION OF A RROGANT-ISM: KOBAYASHI’S “COMFORT WOMAN” PROBLEM) (2002).
101
See generally Uesugi, supra note 101.
102
1702 HANREI JIHO at 150.
103
Id. at 157.
104
See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
105
See, e.g., Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 903-9 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 809-12 (9th Cir. 2003); New Kids on the Block v. News Am.
Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308-9 (9th Cir. 1992).
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to identify the source; he is using it to describe. Coupled with the “datsu” part of
Uesugi’s mark, this case is very similar to the “www.walmartsucks.com” cases106 under
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy107 in the United States.
¶55
Instead of a “fair use” analysis, this case focuses on whether including someone
else’s appellation in the title of a book can be considered “use” at all under Article 2-1-2
of the UCPA. Concluding that such conduct does not constitute “use” of a good or other
appellation as required by Article 2-1-2, the court dismissed Kobayashi’s claim.108
E. K.K. JACCS v. Nihonkai Pakuto109
¶56

In this, Japan’s first domain name case, the defendant had begun using the
appellation JACCS in various places on its website and in its domain name, including
registering the domain name “www.jaccs.co.jp.“ The plaintiff was a large, extremely
well-known credit card company commonly called JACCS. The defendant claimed that
it had legitimate commercial interest in the domain name because it stood for “Japan
Association of Cozy Cradle Society.” One product the defendant sold was toilet seats.
¶57
The case is an example of the use of Article 2-1-1 to enjoin the use of the domain
name at issue under a dilution theory. The parties were obviously not in competition. As
such, any injunction that might have issued in this case would be justified only under a
dilution rationale. However, in enjoining the action, neither the District Court nor the
High Court used the term “dilution” in their opinions.
¶58
The defendant claimed that the statute required the “use” (shiyo) of another’s good
or other appellation. Because “jaccs” merely appeared in its domain name, the defendant
argued that it was not “using” the plaintiff’s trademark in commerce. The court
dismissed this argument and held that registering and having an active website that
included the plaintiff’s appellation was “use” of that appellation for purposes of Article
2-1-1.
F. Levi Strauss v. Edwin Mfg.110
¶59

In this case, the defendant’s stitching in its “501” jeans around the rear pockets
closely resembled the stitching of Levi’s “505” jeans. The court, quite accurately, found
that this was both an infringement and a violation of Article 2-1-1, but not a violation of
106

See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. walmartcanadasucks.com,
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1104.html (UDRP Panel Decision, Nov. 23,
2000) (judgment for respondent).
107
See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm
(last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
108
Kobayashi, however, did prevail at trial on his claim that his moral right of integrity had been
violated. The trial court ordered Uesugi to pay Kobayashi some $250,000 in damages. Uesugi appealed
this decision to the Tokyo High Court, Kobayashi v. Uesugi, 1831 HANREI JIHO 107 (Tokyo High Ct., July
31, 2003), and then to the Supreme Court, but did not prevail. Kobayashi v. Uesugi, 1876 HANREI JIHO 15
(Sup. Ct., July 15, 2004). On the cover of Uesugi’s latest edition of his book, it reads “I beat Yoshinori
99% of the way. We have a judgment recognizing the [right] to quote from manga.” SATOSHI UESUGI,
DATSU-GOHMANISM SENGEN (EX-D ECLARATION OF ARROGANT-ISM) (2002).
109
Reported only at:
http://legal.lexisnexis.jp/jp/lngateway.dll?f=templates&fn=defaultHome_JP.htm&vid=Japan:10.1048/Enu
(Nagoya High Ct., Sept. 10, 2001). The lower court opinion is translated in Port, supra note 91, at 883.
110
1788 HANREI JIHO 103 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 26, 2001).
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Article 2-1-2. As the parties were clearly in competition, Article 2-1-1 was the more
appropriate provision; however the court appropriately refused to label the defendant’s
conduct “dilution” (using the English term, not the Japanese term) even though the
plaintiff had demanded as such.111 Therefore, it used the correct statutory provision to
partially enjoin the defendant, but it used the wrong justification in its explanation.
G. K.K. Daigyotsusho v. J-Phone Higashi Nihon K.K. 112
¶60

In this case, a company by the name of J-Phone started providing cellular telephone
services in February 1997.113 Later that year, the appellant, K.K. Daigyotsusho,
registered the domain name “www.j-phone.co.jp” with JPNIC (Japan Network
Information Center–the equivalent of ICANN in the United States114). Even though JPhone’s services preceded Daigyotsusho’s advertisements by only a few months, the
court found that J-Phone had advertised extensively in newspapers, television, radio, and
magazines.115 The court found that its advertising campaign had reached all corners of
Japan, sufficiently establishing that the plaintiff’s product as well-known.116
¶61
Interestingly enough, the appellant found usages of “j-phone” in New Zealand and
Australia for telecommunication companies dealing with Japan. As such, the appellant
argued that “j-phone” was an ordinary term for a Japanese telephone company.
However, the lower court decided (there is no mention of this argument on appeal) that
such use was negligible and done in a foreign country. Therefore, no weight was given to
this argument at all.117
¶62
Finally in this case, the defendant argued that, as a result of the lower court’s ruling
that it could not use the appellation “j-phone” in a domain name or on its web site, the
court had restricted the appellant’s freedom of expression (hyogennojiyu)118 and the
111

Id. at 111.
Availible at
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/chizai.nsf/Listview01/695F1B89FFD8F6D749256B2F00019773/?OpenD
ocument (Tokyo High Ct., Oct. 25, 2001) (last visited April 22, 2006).
113
It actually began using the term “J-Phone” in 1994, but such use was under the auspices of a trade
name of Tokyo Digital. See J-Phone Higashi Nihon KK v. KK Daigyotsusho, 1755 HANREI JIHO 43
(Tokyo D. Ct., Apr. 24, 2001).
114
See Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers, www.icann.org (last visited Mar. 31,
2006).
115
1755 HANREI JIHO at 51.
116
Id.
117
This argument was brought in accordance with Article 11-1-1 of the UCPA which states as follows:
“the act of using or indicating in a normally-used manner a common name of goods or business. . . [shall
not be a violation of this Act].”
118
Freedom of expression means something a little different than it does in the United States. No
statute has ever been struck down for violating Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution, yet the Japanese
Supreme Court seems intent on keeping freedom of expression as a central part of participatory democracy.
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First Amendment: Disentangling
Culture, Community, and Freedom of Expression, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 905, 928-29 (“Although the Japanese
Supreme Court generally has proven unwilling to interpose the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression over legislative or executive acts, it has exhibited a strong and abiding appreciation for the
importance of free speech in a participatory democracy.”). See also Robert Trager & Yuri Obata,
Obscenity Decisions in the Japanese and United States Supreme Court: Cultural Values in Interpreting
Free Speech, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 247 (2004) (arguing that the definition of obscenity in
Japan is far broader than in the United States).
112
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holding was unconstitutional.119 In response to this claim, the Tokyo High Court stated
that for a judge “[to] prevent unfair competition or the apprehension of unfair
competition is only natural. Through the regulation of unfair competition, even if speech
is restricted to some extent, that is not unconstitutional.”120
Therefore, the
121
freedom of speech argument was dismissed by the High Court.
H. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Puropasuto122
¶63

¶64

¶65

¶66

¶67

Finally, in a case that proposed to draw a distinction between the “well-known”
provision from Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA and the “fame” provision from Article 2-1-2 ,
the Tokyo District Court found VOGUE Magazine well-known but not famous and,
therefore, not diluted under Article 2-1-2.123
The plaintiff was the publisher of a magazine whose name, although a common
term in French that means “in style,” was considered by the court to have acquired a
distinctiveness as used on or in connection with the magazine.124 The defendant owned a
condominium complex called “La Vogue Minami Aoyama.”125
The Tokyo District Court held that even though the appellation “vogue” is a term in
common usage in the United States and France, it was a rather distinctive appellation in
Japan. As such, the court determined that the appellation was well-known for purposes
of Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA. However, since the magazine’s market was limited to
those who read fashion magazines, the court held that it was not famous for purposes of
Article 2-1-2 and, therefore, not diluted.
This was a case that is based on confusion in the broad sense. There was absolutely
no competition between the plaintiff and the defendant. Any potential overlap between
the two marks was only that rather wealthy, stylish people lived in the defendant’s
condominium. Such association was speculative at best and unstated in the case.
Competition was presumed.
If anything, this was an Article 2-1-2 case. VOGUE was either both famous and
diluted or neither. The creation and reliance on this middle standard by Japanese courts,
when nothing to this effect is stated in the legislation whatsoever, muddled things
interminably.

119

Although the court doesn’t cite it, the Japanese Constitution, in relevant part, states as follows:
(1) freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are
guaranteed;
(2) no censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.
KENPO, art. 21.
120
1788 HANREI JIHO at 110.
121
However, it was very creative lawyering to argue that the judgment itself worked as a restriction on a
party’s ability to express itself.
122
1890 HANREI JIHO 127 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 2, 2004).
123
Id. at 141.
124
Id. at 132.
125
Minami Aoyama is a very expensive residential neighborhood in inner Tokyo. Rents in this area
commonly are around $15,000 a month or more for a three bedroom, American-style apartment. See, e.g.,
http://www.kencorp.com/property/property.cgi.
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IV. WHY SO FEW CASES?

¶68

There have been very few cases dealing with dilution in Japan. This is likely due to
multiple factors. First, there are probably more cases than are reported, but even so that
number is likely negligible. Second, the statute is vague and does not even use the word
“dilution,” thus Japan’s civil law judges are not provided with much guidance. Third, the
defensive trademark system, underutilized as it is, provides an alternative to dilution
protection. Fourth, the theoretical understanding of trademark law renders the dilution
claim superfluous.
A. More Cases Than Meet The Eye

¶69

One of the biggest problems researching Japanese trademark dilution is the fact that
judges do not use a standardized term when they mean “dilution.” It is convenient that
the United States has adopted such a standardized term. In the United States, should one
want to search all dilution cases, all one needs to do is search the word “dilution” in the
Westlaw or Lexis databases. To be sure, that number will be large; however it will be
inclusive and conclusive.
¶70
On the other hand, the Japanese courts do us no such favor. There is no
standardized term in use by all Japanese judges for the concept of “dilution.” Courts
might refer to “dilution” in romanized letters, “dilution” in katakana (Japanese script
indicating the word is of foreign origin), or the Japanese term for dilution (kishakuka);
they might use the term “free rider” (furii raida) in katakana, the Japanese term that
means “free rider” (tada nori), or many other possibilities. Most significantly, Japanese
courts have also found dilution without naming it as such, usually under a theory of
presumed confusion because they found confusion “in the broad sense.”
¶71
Therefore, because Japanese courts do not use one standardized term for the cause
of action, searching is extremely difficult.126 On the other hand, if one searches all of the
above usages, one will most likely reveal most of the cases. That is, there are not
hundreds of cases using yet some other indication other than the words given above.
Therefore, it is possible that there are other cases, but that number is not large.127
¶72
Another problem researching Japanese case law in general is the fact that there is
no official reporter where all or substantially all opinions are collected. Rather, there are
multiple “magazine” type publications that publish one or sometimes two trademark
cases every two weeks. Therefore, it is possible that some trademark dilution cases exist
but simply go unreported in any of the seven or eight journals where one would expect to
find them. Although that is the case, there is a grand tradition in Japan to discuss
important cases through study groups and the like on the faculty level. These professors
closely watch, hear about, and discuss the various pending cases. It is, therefore, possible

126

For example, if one searches “Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA”, LexisNexis Japan turns up thirty-eight
cases; if one searches “kishakuka and shyohyo” (dilution and trademark), sixty-five post-1993 cases are
reported. By comparison, if one searches “Federal Trademark Dilution Act,” Lexis U.S. reports 287 cases
since 1996; if one searches “trademark dilution,” over 1300 cases are reported. (Searches performed on
Feb. 26, 2006.)
127
See, e.g., Chanel ASA v. Sugimura, 986 HANREI TAIMUZU 181 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 10, 1999) (holding
that “Chanel Snack” as used in katakana for a small drinking establishment is enjoined–no mention of
“dilution”).
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that some unreported and important judicial decisions exist, but rather unlikely that a vast
number of these decisions exist.
B. Statute is Vague
¶73

As indicated above, Japan has no statute that contains the word “dilution” or any of
its derivatives in English or Japanese. Therefore, the fact that this law is to prevent
something known as “dilution” is perceived intuitively from the fact that there is no
other, more specific provision of the law that allows for this cause of action.
Additionally, Article 2-1-1 is also used to prevent a host of other acts considered to be
“unfair” under the statute.
As a result, Japanese courts cannot keep these causes of
action straight. Japanese courts routinely interchange, with no discernable pattern, the
causes of action that (1) prevent a well-known appellation from confusing use, and (2)
prevent a famous appellation from any use by a third party.
¶74
Furthermore, Japanese courts do not seem to recognize the substantial difference
between “causes confusion” and an “apprehension of confusion.” Japanese courts
sometimes require confusion in Article 2-1-2 cases – even though the statute only says
“use” (shiyo) – and sometimes even presume confusion for purposes of Article 2-1-1 if
the appellation is famous enough.
¶75
As such, it seems that it would be exceedingly difficult to predict when a client is
likely to prevail in Article 2-1-1 or 2-1-2 cases, especially if one considers its famous
appellation to be diluted by non-competing use. The scattered reasoning demonstrated by
Japanese courts on the issue of dilution does not seem to provide the predictability one
would expect from an otherwise highly developed legal system such as Japan’s. 128
¶76
Although other developed nations’ dilution statutes do not necessarily use the term
“dilution” either,129 they are far more specific. The courts in these other countries,
outside of the United States, seem to have well-defined and consistent concept of
dilution.130 Therefore, it seems that Japanese judges find something inherently flawed
about the dilution rationale.

128
To be fair, many US courts do not get this right either. Many require some form of confusion before
they will grant an injunction. For example, New York courts used to require evidence of confusion even
though the New York statute clearly dictates that dilution may be found regardless of confusion. Oddly
enough, the Illinois courts have refused to find dilution if there is confusion. Therefore, New York courts
required confusion while Illinois courts preclude dilution remedies when there is confusion. See generally
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976). Compare 765 I LL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 1040/0.01 (1986) with N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 368-d (McKinney 1992) (now repealed).
129
For example, the British statute reads as follows:
(3) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign which
(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is
registered, where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign, being
without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of
the trademark.
1994 UK Trade Marks Act [1995], § 10(3). See also David S. Welkowitz, Protection Against Trademark
Dilution in the U.K. and Canada: Inexorable Trend or Will Tradition Triumph?, 24 HASTINGS INT’ L &
COMP. L. REV. 63, 84-88 (2000).
130
Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Rests., [1995] IP & T Digest 21 (U.K.); Mars UK Ltd. v. Burgess,
[2004] W.L. 1476759 (Ch. D.).
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The American instinct is to dismiss Japanese judges as uninformed or ignorant.
This conclusion is fostered by the ambiguity of the UCPA itself. However, I
categorically deny the notion that Japanese judges are just missing the boat. The
Japanese judiciary is a well-educated, well-trained group of career jurists. They are not
political appointees like United States federal judges. They enter the judiciary upon
graduating from the Legal Research and Training Institute.131 District and Appellate
Court judges have had no other job in their life other than as a judge. They are supported
by a very well-paid and motivated research and support staff.132 The idea that Japanese
judges are just uninformed or ignorant of trademark dilution is simply not believable.
C. Defensive Mark Registration System is Not Used Either

Under the defensive mark registration system,133 “widely recognized” trademarks
can be registered134 to protect identified goods or services135 other than those listed in the
original registration. This system does not exist in the United States. Additional goods
or services need not be similar to the original goods or services, and the registrant need
not have any use for these additional goods or services nor any intent to use the mark on
these additional goods or services.136 The requirements are only that the mark be “widely
recognized by consumers” (hiroku ninshiki sareteiru) and that there be an apprehension
of confusion (kondo no osore) if the mark is used on these additional goods or services by
a third party.137 It is not difficult to see why this has been referred to as a “super
registry.”138
¶79
Whether a trademark is “widely recognized” (or “famous”)139 for purposes of a
defensive mark application is determined by referring to Guidelines for Examination of
Trademarks published by the Japanese Patent Office. According to this manual, the
determination of a registered trademark’s degree of fame is made by referring to the
following items:
(1)
Duration and area of use;
(2)
The range of goods on which the mark is used;
(3)
Extent of advertisement used or other methods of publicizing the mark;
(4)
The nature of the user’s business and scale of use of the mark; and
¶78

131

Haley, supra note 27 at 43.
Id. at 114-18.
133
See generally SHOEN ONO, SHOHYOHO GAISETSU [OUTLINE OF TRADEMARK LAW] 166-71 (1999).
It might be somewhat telling that in this, a primary source of Japanese trademark law, the author elects to
only give the defensive mark system some five pages of coverage.
134
Trademarks are registered in Japan just like any country. The applicant fills out a form, pays the
proscribed fee, and, unless there is a statutory reason to deny the registration, such as if the mark is generic
or merely descriptive, the Japanese Patent Office issues a registration certificate. See generally Japanese
Trademark Law, Law No. 47 of 1959. See also PORT, supra note 5.
135
“Identified Goods or Services” herein refers to those specific goods or services named in the
trademark application. The trademark registration is only valid as used on those specific goods or services
and on similar goods and services.
136
Yasuichi Arao, Bogohyoshoseido nitsuite [On the Defensive Mark System], 138 SHOJIHOMU KENKYU
10 (1959).
137
Trademark Law, Art. 64.
138
Suzuki, supra note 5, at 171.
139
For defensive mark applications, “widely recognized” (hirokuninshikisareta) now becomes
synonymous with “famous” (chomei). See ONO, supra note 133, at 130.
132
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(5)
The amount of recognition the mark already enjoys within the Patent
Office.140
Not surprisingly, most likely because the strict nature of the requirements to prove
a mark is widely recognized,141 very few marks have been registered as defensive marks.
Furthermore, the JPO and courts seem overly restrictive in granting defensive mark
registrations.
The JPO and Japanese courts require that the registration of the mark a defensive
mark must be “identical” to the primary registered trademark.142 Therefore, the Tokyo
High Court affirmed an examiner’s rejection of “Mercedes-Benz” as a defensive mark
application for string, rope, or netting because it was not identical to its principal mark,
Mercedes-Benz as registered for use on automobiles. That is, the marks do not share the
same font and the primary registered trademark is in all upper case letters.143 The court
held that “if the plaintiff [Mercedes-Benz] wanted to prevent the use of its mark in this
fashion, they ought to elect to register the mark as an associated trademark. Attempting
to interpret this as a defensive mark registration is absurd (sujichigai).”144
Given the specific language of the Trademark Law,145 it is difficult to determine
who is being absurd. It appears on the surface that this is a perfect example of a famous
mark that deserves defensive mark registration status. However, the court also read
strictly the requirement that there be some apprehension of confusion as to source in the
class of goods under which defensive mark registration is sought. Because there was
none here, the court found the associated mark doctrine to be the best source of protection
for Mercedes-Benz.
The JPO also denied 3M Corporation’s defensive mark registration application for
its SCOTCH trademark, which is registered in Japan for use on tapes and other adhesives,
to prevent its use on kitchen utensils and other kitchen products. The Examiner claimed
that there was no apprehension of confusion because 3M used SCOTCH in upper case
letters on some goods, while on others the mark appeared in lower case letters, and
therefore the marks were not identical.146
140

KANJI KUDO, SHINSA KIJUN NO KAISETSU (Explanation of Trademark Examination Guidelines)
(1996) at 306.
141
ZENTARO KITAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, at 3.01[3][c].
142
See Trademark Law, Art. 64.
143
Daimler Benz AG v. JPO, 1326 HANREI JIHO 145 (Tokyo High Ct., July 27, 1989).
144
Id. at 147. Mercedes’ contention was absurd, of course, because the statute also requires some
likelihood of confusion. The associated mark system has now been abolished. See PORT, supra note 5, at
105. See also Kazuo Morioka, Shyohyoho Oyobi Fuseikyosouboshihoni iu “Juyoshanoaidani Hiroku
Ninshikisareteiru” no Imi [Interpretation of Trademarks “Well Known Among Consumers”], 37 PAT.
STUDIES 17 (2004) (discussing the fact that the term “well known” is used seven places in the Trademark
Law and the UCPA and concluding that when used in regard to defensive marks, it means something
different than when used in Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA. In defensive marks, “well known” now means
nationwide use, not regional or local use).
145
Trademark Law, Art. 64 states as follows: “The owner of a registered trademark may obtain a
defensive mark registration of a mark identical with the registered trademark with respect to goods or
services with which and apprehension of confusion exists. . .” Apparently, identical, for once, really
means “identical.”
146
1563 HANREI JIHO 134 (Tokyo High Ct., Jan. 30, 1996). See also, Kazuo Morioka, Shyohyoho
Oyobi Fuseikyosouboshihoni iu “Juyoshanoaidani Hiroku Ninshikisareteiru” no Imi (Interpretation of
Trademarks “Well Known Among Consumers”), 37 Patent Studies 17 (2004) (discussing the fact that the
term “well known” is used seven places in the Trademark Law and the UCPA and concluding that when
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However, the Tokyo High Court held that SCOTCH was, indeed, well-known and
reversed the JPO’s decision. The court determined that the appropriate standard should
include an analysis of the trademark as it is actually used. If consumers would presume
that the principal mark and the mark that is subject of a defensive mark application
identify the same source, then the mark should be considered identical and appropriate
for defensive mark registration.147
The defensive mark system is already in place for a “famous” registry, making
Article 2-1-2 somewhat superfluous.148 This super registry afforded by the defensive
mark system is the precise mechanism third party users of appellations might rely upon to
determine when someone else’s appellation is famous. Of course, this is only analogous
to a super registry for marks subject to dilution. However, because Japan has such a
registry in place for famous marks for purposes of the defensive mark system, the leap to
a registry for appellations subject to dilution protection is not that great.
The defensive mark system is somewhat redundant to dilution protection because it
already provides an avenue by which registrants of famous marks might find additional
protection. Of course, it applies only when there is an apprehension of confusion and
therefore is not precisely responsive to a traditional dilutive setting; however. Because
Japanese courts are inconsistent in the requirement of competition, or not, one would
expect a Japanese attorney zealously representing the interests of his or her clients to be
very interested in the defensive mark system when the client is the owner of a famous
mark.
However, all that being the case, the defensive mark system is a perfect example of
how countries could require registration on a super registry before dilution protection is
granted.149 Because the Japanese have the defensive mark system already in place, it is
not as much of an extension to require such a registration of anyone claiming protection
under Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA.
This system is drastically underutilized.150 It is underutilized because it provides
protection that few actually desire. The system requires the would-be defendant’s mark
to be identical to the would-be plaintiff’s mark. Defendants do not often adopt identical
copies of famous marks. Of course, if they do and they do it with the intent to deceive,
used in regard to defensive marks, it means something different than when used in Article 2-1-1 of the
UCPA. In defensive marks, “well known” now means nationwide use, not regional or local use.).
147
See Morioka, supra note 146.
148
In fact, the JPO now maintains a searchable database in English (see
http://www1.ipdl.ncipi.go.jp/chomei/search_e.cgi?login&1127886096828)
and in Japanese (http://www1.ipdl.ncipi.go.jp/chomei/search_j.cgi?login&1127885941593) for famous
marks. This database is maintained by the JPO without requiring any proof on behalf of the entrants.
149
See Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law
System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 894 (2000). For a detailed analysis of the pros and
cons of adopting a super registry in the United States, see Lars S. Smith, Implementing a Registration
System for Famous Trademarks, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1097, 1106-07 (2003), and Kenneth L. Port, The
Trademark Super Registry: A Response to Professor Smith, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 881 (2004).
150
Registrations per year of defensive marks:
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
156
103
121
143
60
Source: JPO at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/nenji/nenpou2005_pdf/toukei/02-05_02.pdf. As this
table indicates, applicants are not busting down the JPO’s door to get at the defensive mark registration
system. Only sixty were registered in 2004.
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the defensive mark system is there to help prevent such conduct. However, this probably
does not happen very frequently.151 This defensive mark system would help Fuji Film
prevent the use and registration of Fuji for bicycles, if they registered for a defensive
mark. However, as there were only sixty defensive mark registrations in all of Japan in
2004, it appears that this kind of conduct is rare.
¶89
The system also provides enough time for the would-be plaintiff to file for the
trademark application for a defensive mark, rather than just initiating a lawsuit. Nearly
all of the Article 2-1-2 cases reviewed for this article were ripe for a defensive mark
registration. Rather than registering, the plaintiffs elected to file for an injunction and
damages under Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA.
¶90
Therefore, there are redundancies built into the Japanese system. These
redundancies themselves may be providing a chilling effect on the frequency with which
lawsuits are filed under Article 2-1 of the UCPA. The existence of the defensive mark
system provides an alternative route for protecting famous marks.
D. Dilution is Superfluous in Japan
¶91

Dilution protection, as defined herein, is not a surprising expansion of the law, as it
was in the United States.152 Courts in Japan frequently engage in protecting trademarks
even without a showing of competition between the parties. They do this by calling it
“confusion in the broad sense of the term.”153
¶92
Japanese courts generally approach confusion as “narrow” (kyogi) confusion and
“wide” (kogi) confusion.154 That is, Japanese courts consider narrow confusion to exist
when two parties are in direct competition. Confusion in the wider sense of the term
(kogi) is used to prevent conduct that may also be prevented under a dilution rationale.155
¶93
Therefore, when “Mitsubishi Building Company” uses the appellation
“Mitsubishi,” it is not unreasonable to believe that all companies named “Mitsubishi” are
related, even though at that time, the larger and famous Mitsubishi did not have a
“building” company in its quiver.156 Also, when the defendant used the appellation
“Womanpower” for temporary secretarial services, they were deemed to be in
competition with “Manpower,” even though there was no direct evidence that this was, in
fact, the case.157 The court stated that there was an apprehension that people would
believe Womanpower was a subsidiary of Manpower and, even though there was no
151
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direct evidence of their competition in the marketplace, the court deemed them in
competition. In both of these representative cases, the court simply deemed the parties to
be in “competition” with each other even though there was no direct evidence to that
alleged and important fact.158
¶94
The holding in Japanese Womanpower K.K. v. Manpower Japan K.K., seems to
allow for a plaintiff to “bridge the gap.”159 That is, although the defendant may not be in
competition with the plaintiff at the time of the case, there is reasonable expectation that
they may actually be in competition in the future. Instead of using this potentially more
appropriate analysis, however, the courts in these cases merely deem competition to be
present.
Worse yet, if the holder of a famous mark can be presumed to be in
competition with anyone who might come along, then there is really no need for a
dilution statute at all and it is not surprising in the least that Article 2-1-2 is underutilized.
V. CONCLUSION
¶95

¶96

¶97

¶98

¶99

¶100

Given the overall circumstances of trademark protection in Japan, it is not
surprising that there are very few traditional “dilution” cases. The statute is too vague to
be of any real guide – it does not even mention the word “dilution.” The statute allows
an injunction and damages in the event that a famous mark is used and does not require
the plaintiff to establish confusion. While this cause of action sounds like dilution, it
would help Japanese courts immensely if that word was used, so that the Japanese
legislature’s intent could be more easily determined.
Judges in Japan do not stick to an establish vocabulary when addressing dilutionlike cases. They use terms like “free-riding” or other terms to describe what would be a
dilution case if it were raised in the United States. This lack of a standardized vocabulary
leads to further confusion regarding the cause of action and makes it appear that even
fewer cases are raised.
The nature of trademark infringement also makes dilution redundant. The
defensive mark system in Japan provides an alternative to trademark owners who desire
to protect their famous marks from use by non-competitors on non-competing goods.
However, even this system, in place in Japan since 1959,160 is underutilized.
The other redundancy regards the trademark right itself. In Japan, the trademark
right can be conceived of “broadly.” Under the so-called broad conception, confusion
and competition are not necessary. When the mark is famous, Japanese courts sometimes
will presume confusion.
The state of confusion over this cause of action and the resulting diminished
number of cases may be interconnected. Through this confusion, Japanese judges either
intentionally or intuitively apply a brake to the application of dilution law in Japan.
On the other hand, perhaps the apparent lack of dilution in Japan is not an
aberration. Perhaps it is not that there is no dilution in Japan; perhaps the issue is
158
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whether there is really much actual dilution anywhere. Perhaps it is the United States that
is the aberration. Maybe, it is just that, in the United States, we see dilution everywhere
and over utilize the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
¶101
One way or the other, Japanese trademark dilution law is in a state of confusion and
disarray. Such confusion does not help in developing a coherent and predictable body of
law. The rest of Japanese trademark law is highly predictable and certainly coherent.
That trademark dilution law is not stands out as an oddity.
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